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Abstract 
We examine the degree of regional vs. global financial integration of East Asian countries in three 
ways; (1) comparing the size of cross-border assets such as securities and bank claims, (2) 
estimating the gravity model of bilateral financial asset holdings, and (3) estimating consumption 
risk sharing model. The results suggest that East Asian financial markets, particularly compared to 
the European ones, are relatively less integrated with each other than to global markets. We also 
find relatively more evidence of regional financial integration in bank claim markets than portfolio 
asset markets. The low financial integration within East Asia is attributed to the low incentives for 
portfolio diversification within the region, the low degree of development and deregulation of 
financial markets, and the instability in monetary and exchange rate regime.  
 
 
 
+This paper was presented at the Workshop on Global Imbalances and Asian Financial Markets, September 
29-30, 2005, UC Berkeley. We are grateful to Galina Hale, Gyutaeg Oh, and Andrew Rose for helpful 
comments and Chi-soo Chung and Ju-Hyun Pyun for data assistance.   
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I. Introduction  
 
In East Asia, there has been a rapid increase in international capital mobility, as 
East Asia has been deregulating their financial markets since the early 1990s. This 
continuous financial opening process has rendered the economies of the region to become 
integrated into global financial markets. The available empirical evidence suggests that the 
East Asian financial markets became increasingly integrated with the markets of developed 
countries over the last decades. (Bekaert and Harvey 1995, World Bank 1997, and 
Eichengreen and Park 2005a).  
However, it is not clear that the international financial liberalization and integration 
process has contributed to the integration of financial markets within the region. In general, 
trade liberalization tends to bring about trade integration on both global and regional levels, 
though possibly more on the regional level. In a similar vein, we might expect that capital 
market liberalization can also make these economies more closely linked with one another 
through cross-border financial transactions. On the contrary, several studies claimed that 
the degree of financial market linkage in East Asia remains still low and that, unlike trade 
integration, the integration of financial markets in this region has been occurring more on a 
global level rather than on a regional level.  
The majority of empirical studies suggest such evidence, that the level of financial 
market integration in East Asia is relatively lower compared to Europe and that East Asia is 
integrated through global financial markets rather than through regional ones. Park and Bae 
(2002) and Eichengreen and Park (2005b) both analyzed the distribution of the nationality 
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of the lead managers, Japanese overseas portfolio investment, co-movement of interest 
rates and stock prices. They concluded that East Asia has developed stronger financial ties 
with the U.S. and Western Europe than with one another. Based on various tests utilizing 
cross-country interest rate and stock price data, Jeon, Oh, and Yang (2005) and Keil, 
Phalapleewan, Rajan and Willett (2004) also support this finding. Kim, Kim, and Wang 
(2004, 2006) estimated the degree of risk sharing for East Asia by using a cross-country 
consumption correlation and formal regression analysis. They found the degree of regional 
risk sharing within East Asia is quite low. 
Despite this general tenor of existing research that indicates a low degree of 
financial integration in East Asia, some studies provide opposing evidence. For instance, 
McCauley, Fung, and Gadanecz (2002) assert that the financial markets of East Asia are 
more integrated than is often suggested. They show that in the international bond market 
and the international syndicated loan market, East Asian investors and banks have on 
average committed half of the funds in bonds underwritten and loans syndicated for 
borrowers in East Asia.   
The progress and prospect of regional financial integration in East Asia has been an 
important area to study among economists, as well as public officials in the region. Greater 
financial integration in East Asia can be beneficial in several ways. With mobile 
international capital flows, each country can smooth its consumption and finance 
investment, regardless of its temporary income level. With full international financial 
integration, each country can be insured against country-specific income risks. These are 
general benefits of international financial integration, which can be enjoyed at various 
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levels of international financial integration. The regional financial integration such as 
financial integration within Asia, can also provide such benefits. For example, when global 
financial integration is not complete, an increase in financial integration within East Asia 
can enhance the welfare of East Asia.1  
However, surprisingly little justification is made to advocate that regional financial 
integration should be even deeper than global financial integration is.  Rather, there is an 
argument that supports the opposite.  In order to diversify portfolios, investors may want 
to buy equities more from a distant country than a neighboring one, since business cycle co-
movements tend to be lower for the pair of countries that are more distant. 
One compelling argument to justify advocating more regional financial integration 
is that it can contribute to the formation of monetary integration in the region by decreasing 
the costs of monetary integration. Monetary integration entails virtually no role for 
individual monetary policy and a very limited scope for individual fiscal stabilization. As 
such, monetary integration may imply substantial costs for individual member countries, 
especially when the business cycles of the member countries are not synchronized. 
Regional risk sharing through regional financial market integration can insure against 
country-specific income/consumption risks. Therefore, the costs of monetary integration 
may decrease substantially through regional financial market integration even when 
business cycles are not synchronized. 
Further, regional financial integration can strengthen regional financial cooperation 
                                            
1 Kim, Kim, and Wang (2004, 2005) reported that East Asia would have substantial benefits from regional 
financial integration if the financial integration within East Asia is strengthened substantially. 
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and thus provide additional benefits to individual countries. Since the financial crisis of 
1997-98, various financial arrangements started to promote financial and monetary 
cooperation in East Asia. Although regional cooperation has already produced some 
concrete results, such as a network of bilateral swap agreements under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, its future remains uncertain. Further financial integration among East Asian 
economies will go hand in hand with financial and monetary cooperation in the region. For 
instance, in recent years, there have been discussions on how to pool accumulated 
international reserves of East Asian economies and use them to develop an East Asian 
regional bond market.  
In addition, regional financial integration can help to develop local financial 
service industries by enhancing the role of financial intermediaries in the region. Many 
western banks and nonblank financial institutions have established an extensive network of 
branches and intermediaries throughout East Asia. Because these western financial 
institutions have superior financial technology and expertise, East Asian corporations and 
banks are likely to rely more on them for financial service. However, the pervasive 
dominance of global financial institutions may not serve always the best to local needs. For 
example, small and medium enterprises, even the most efficient ones, in the region may not 
easily get access to international bond markets. Countries in East Asia have been working 
together to develop regional financial market as a part of their strategy to deepen regional 
financial cooperation.  
Given that the extent to which East Asian economies are financially integrated 
among them is still unclear, this paper aims at reassessing the degree of regional financial 
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integration in East Asia with new data and new methodologies. First, we compile data on 
cross-border holdings of international financial assets including equity portfolio, debt 
securities, and bank claims for 1997 through 2004. By analyzing the geographical 
composition of the portfolio investment and bank assets holdings in East Asia, we will 
assess the degree of regional and global financial market integration in East Asia and 
compare it to that in Europe and Latin America. We adopt a gravity model of bilateral 
financial asset holdings to formally test if East Asian financial markets are relatively less 
integrated with each other than to global markets, particularly compared to the European 
ones. To our knowledge, no empirical paper to date has systematically assessed the degree 
of regional and global financial integration in East Asia utilizing this data set.2  
We also implement an alternative analysis to provide some insights on the extent of 
regional and global financial market integration. By extending the standard empirical 
analysis on consumption risk sharing, we estimate the degree of regional and global 
consumption risk sharing. In contrast to previous studies, such as Kim, Kim, and Wang 
(2004, 2006), we assess the extent of both regional and global consumption risk sharing 
models in one empirical framework. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section II, we analyze the 
data on geographical distribution of international portfolio assets and bank claims for East 
Asia compared to that for Europe, in order to judge the degree of regional and global asset 
diversification of East Asia. A gravity model of bilateral financial asset holdings is adopted 
                                            
2 An exception is Eichengreen and Park (2005a) that has adopted the gravity model to assess the extent and 
causes of the East Asia’s intra-region integration. But this study looks at evidence in the international bank 
loan market for 2000 only.  
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to formally test if East Asian financial markets are relatively less integrated within the 
region than in global markets, particularly compared with ones in Europe. Section III 
introduces the empirical framework on consumption risk sharing, and estimates the degree 
of regional and global consumption risk sharing for East Asia and Europe. Section IV 
discusses several hypotheses that explain the low degree of regional financial integration in 
East Asia. Concluding remarks follow in Section V. 
 
II. Regional and Global Diversification of Financial Assets  
 
We look at the stylized pattern of the regional composition of the portfolio 
investment and bank asset holdings. The degree of financial market integration within East 
Asia can be judged by the share of East Asia in international asset holdings for East Asia, 
compared to the comparable figures for European or Latin American countries. In addition, 
the intra-regional investment of East Asia can be compared to their investment in the U.S. 
or the global financial markets. Thus, we can judge the degree of regional and global asset 
diversification of East Asia. We have compiled data on cross-border holdings of financial 
assets including portfolio assets and bank claims.  
 
1. Data 
 
We are interested in comparing cross-border financial transactions within East Asia 
and those within other regions. Therefore, we require data on international asset holdings 
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on a bilateral basis that distinguish the country of origin and destination. 
Data on international portfolio asset holdings have recently published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF conducted the Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) for the first time in 1997, and annually since 2001.  
The first CPIS involved 20 economies and the CPIS 2001 expanded to the 
participation of 67 source economies including several offshore and financial centers. In 
each case, the bilateral positions of the source countries in 223 destination 
countries/territories are reported.3 The CPIS provides a breakdown of a country’s stock of 
portfolio investment assets by country of residency of the nonresident issuer. Problems of 
survey methods and under-reporting of assets by participating countries are pointed out as 
shortcomings of the CPIS data (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). Nevertheless, the CPIS 
survey presents a unique opportunity for the examination of foreign equity and debt 
holdings of many participating countries. 
Data on international bank claims are from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). It is the consolidated international bank claims of BIS reporting banks by nationality 
of lenders and borrowers. We gathered these data for 25 reporting countries including two 
reporting banks from East Asia (Japan and Taiwan) and 15 European countries from the 
BIS Quarterly Review.4 The data are available from 1983 on a biannual basis, but most 
countries report more complete bilateral data from 1999. We have also obtained compatible 
data for South Korea from its supervisory authority. Note that although the data set includes 
                                            
3 Refer to the IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm for details. 
4 Refer to the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/statistics/histstats10.htm for details. 
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only three countries in East Asia reporting consolidated foreign bank claims, the other 
countries, such as Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand, are included as the country of destination for the bank loans. 
 
2. Regional and Global Structure of International Financial Assets: Stylized Facts  
 
Portfolio Investment 
Table 1 provides the geographical distribution of total portfolio investment asset 
holdings for East Asian and European countries in 2003. The table highlights that the 
degree of cross-country asset holdings within East Asia is lower than that of Europe. The 
share of intra-East Asia holdings is about 14% on average for 8 East Asian economies.5 It 
is only 1.3% in Japan and 7.9% in South Korea. Malaysia has the largest intra-East Asia 
share, amounting to 46% of its international portfolio assets. Respectively, the intra-region 
share is about 16% and 20% for Hong Kong and Singapore. 
In comparison, most of Europe holds more than one half of their portfolio assets 
within Europe. On average, the share of intra-Europe asset holdings is 58% for 17 
European countries.6 It reaches 82% in Finland and 73% in France. Iceland (37%) and the 
U.K. (42%) have relatively lower intra-Europe share percentages. For the U.K., the below 
                                            
5 The weighted average is much smaller. The eight East Asian economies hold only 4.9% of their total 
portfolio asset holdings, amounting to $2.2 trillion US dollars, in East Asia.  
6 The weighted average is also similar to this simple average figure. The intra-Europe share of total portfolio 
asset holdings for 17 European economies is 57%.  
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average Europe share in holdings of international assets reflects that London is a global 
financial center.  In fact, the U.K. residents hold relatively larger share positions in East 
Asia (11%) than other European country residents do.  
Table 1 also reports information for the U.S. At the end of 2003, the share of East 
Asia in the international investment portfolio of the US (14.3%) is far above the average of 
Europe (3.2%).  
Table 1 also presents data on the size of total international portfolio asset holdings. 
The total recorded level of portfolio investment in the CPIS 2003 is US $16.5 trillion (tln). 
The G-5 countries are major investors in the international securities markets. The largest 
foreign investor is the U.S. It holds cross-border assets amounting to about US $ 3.1 tln or 
19.1% of the total international portfolio assets. In East Asia, Japan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore are the major investors. Japan holds international portfolio assets of about US 
$1.7 tln or 10.5% of the total international portfolio asset. Hong Kong and Singapore hold 
US $335 and US $144 bln, respectively. Their investment in East Asian financial assets 
amounts to US $54.6 bln in Hong Kong, $29.1 bln in Singapore, and $22.4 bln in Japan. In 
comparison, the other East Asian countries such as South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia 
hold very small amount of East Asian financial assets. In total, the eight East Asian 
countries hold about US $ 2.2 tln of the total international portfolio assets and about US 
$108.7 bln of East Asian financial assets. They are smaller than the comparable figures for 
Europe, which holds US $9.2 tln of the total international portfolio assets and about US $ 
389.3 bln of European assets. 
When scaling portfolio holdings by GDP, small economies with financial and 
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offshore centers dominate the picture. For instance, Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland, and 
Switzerland have total assets amounting to several times their own domestic output levels. 
For a typical East Asian economy, on the other hand, bilateral financial linkages are a 
relatively small fraction of its GDP.  
Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide the geographical distribution of portfolio investment 
holdings separately for each asset- equity, long-term debt, and short-term debt securities. 
The distribution of equity or debt securities asset holdings shows a stylized pattern 
similar to that of total portfolio assets. Table 2 shows that the share of intra-East Asia equity 
asset holdings for most East Asian economies, is in general, far lower than that of intra-
Europe equity asset holdings for Europe. The share of intra-East Asia equity holdings is 
about 20% on average for 8 East Asian economies. This is lower than the average intra-
Europe share of 44% in Europe. Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore- the three largest 
investors in East Asia- hold international portfolio assets of about US $274.5 bln, US 
$152.8 bln, and US $42.7 bln, respectively and their intra-East Asian shares are 3.9%, 17% 
and 28%, respectively. The intra-East Asian share is exceptionally high in Malaysia, which 
invests 75% of its cross-border equity assets in East Asia. But Malaysia is a very small 
investor, of which total international portfolio assets amount to only US $3.4 bln.  
In comparison to equity investment, the intra-East Asia share is relatively lower in 
international debt securities markets. Table 3 shows the geographical distribution of long-
term debt securities. On average, the share of intra-East Asian long-term debt securities 
asset holdings is about 10% for 8 East Asian economies and ranges from 0.8% in Japan to 
15.3% in Malaysia. For the short-term debt securities market, the intra-East Asia share is 
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only 5.7%. In contrast, the average intra-Europe share for 17 European countries is about 
68% and 66% of long- and short-term debt securities, respectively. 
 
Bank Lending 
Table 5 reports level and geographical distribution of cross-border bank claims for 
East Asia, Europe and the U.S. at end-2003. We have data for three East Asian reporting 
countries (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). The share of intra-East Asia bank claims is 
7.3% in Japan, 36% in South Korea, and 26% in Taiwan. The intra-region shares of bank 
claims for Japan and South Korea are larger than the comparable figures of equity or debt 
securities asset holdings for these countries. This may indicate that the degree of bank loan 
market integration is relatively larger than that of portfolio market integration in East Asia. 
Nevertheless, East Asia is a small investor in the international bank lending markets. While 
Europe holds about US $10.7 tln international bank claims in total and about US $5.5 tln 
claims within Europe, East Asia holds only about US $1.4 tln total claims in international 
bank lending markets and US $130 bln within East Asia.  
East Asian banks tended to have large bank claims within East Asia. But, lending to 
East Asian banks dropped after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. This occurred not only 
due to a reduced willingness to lend, but also because of a weaker demand for loans in the 
region. In this region, the shift to current account surpluses, corporate deleveraging and an 
increase in equity investment inflows made external bank financing less needed (Jeanneau 
and Micu, 2003). BIS data shows that the share of intra-East Asian bank claims for the 
Japanese banks continued to decline from 14.4% in 2001 to 7.3% in 2004.  
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While East Asian economies tend to be more integrated in the commercial bank 
loan market, the degree of cross-border bank claim within East Asia is still lower than that 
of Europe. The intra-Europe share in holdings of international bank claims is 60.4% on 
average for 16 European countries. A notable exception is the U.K., which holds only 30% 
of international bank claims within Europe. Again, this reflects London’s status as a global 
financial center.  
Comparing the intra-East Asian share of cross-border financial assets for East Asia 
to that of Europe may not be appropriate, because the two regions are quite dissimilar in 
terms of economic development and financial infrastructure. For comparison, the 
geographical distribution of international financial asset holdings for the Latin American 
countries is presented in Table 6. 
The share of intra-Latin America total portfolio asset holdings is low in most of 
Latin America. For instance, it is 3% in Argentina, 4% in Chile, and 6% in Mexico. Panama 
has an exceptionally higher intra-regional share of 42%, reflecting its hosting of offshore 
financial centers. Similar patterns are also visible in the separate categories of equity, long- 
and short-debt securities. The intra-Latin America share in bank claims is relatively higher 
than that in portfolio assets, ranging from 6% in Brazil to 48% in Panama. The intra-
regional shares of international financial assets for most of Latin America are similar in 
magnitude to those of East Asian economies.  
 
3. A Gravity-Model Test of Regional Financial Integration in East Asia 
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To the data set on international portfolio asset holdings and bank claims, we added a 
number of other variables that are necessary to estimate the gravity model. We collected 
population and real GDP data from the IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS). The 
bilateral trade data are from the “Direction of Trade” (DoT) data set.7 The nominal values 
were converted to real values using the common U.S. GDP deflator for every country.8 A 
number of country specific variables such as distance, land area, language and land border 
were obtained from Rose (2000).9 Finally for Taiwan, we acquired the data on GDP and 
population from the web site of the Asian Development Bank and the bilateral trade data 
from the Bureau of Foreign Trade in Taiwan.  
The data set has features of a panel structure consisting of 13,971 annual 
observations from 1999 to 2003 clustered by 4,475 country pair groups for the portfolio 
data and 11,974 annual observations clustered by 4,364 country pair groups for the bank 
claims data.10  The number of observations varies per year. Summary statistics for each 
data set used in the estimation are presented in Table 7.  East Asian country pairs 
constitute about 1 % in each data set, while the proportion of European country pairs is 
much larger amounting to about 6 % for the portfolio data set and about 10 % for the bank 
                                            
7 Direction of Trade reports bilateral trade on FOB exports and CIF imports recorded in American dollars. 
We deflate trade by the American GDP deflator. Then we calculate an average value of bilateral trade 
between a pair of countries by averaging all of the four possible measures potentially available. 
8 For an ideal case, it would be preferable to use a separate deflator for each country, but such deflators in a 
unified framework are not available. 
9 The data set is available on the web page, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/, maintained by Andrew 
Rose. 
10 Since most asset holdings data start from 1999, we have ignored the observations before then.  Due to the 
lack of bilateral trade data, we end the sample period at 2003. 
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claims. The average size of portfolio asset holdings (22.343) in the logarithm value is much 
larger than that of bank claims (1.245).  
We set up a gravity model of the bilateral financial asset holdings.  The gravity 
model was originally developed as an explanation for the gravitational forces. Initially, the 
model was adopted by economists to study foreign trade without firm theoretical grounds. 
In its basic form, trade between two countries depends positively on their total income and 
negatively on the distance between them.  The model can be extended to include other 
variables, depending on the study’s purpose. Great empirical success of the gravity model 
to explain the bilateral trade flows has motivated a number of theoretical models that can 
justify it.11  
While the gravity model to explain bilateral trade flows has a long history, there 
have been relatively few attempts made to use a gravity model in explaining exchanges of 
financial assets.  The main reason is that unlike goods, financial assets are weightless, 
hence distance cannot represent for transaction costs. Recently, however, Portes and Rey 
(2005) find that a gravity model performs at least as well in asset trade as goods trade.12 
Portes and Rey interpret that information friction is positively correlated with distance, 
justifying that financial asset trade is also negatively related to distance. Following their 
model, this paper also used a gravity model as a basic framework that takes the following 
form: 
 
                                            
11 See Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), and Evenett and Keller (2002) for the theoretical background of 
the gravity equation. 
12 See subsequent researches including Buch (2002, 2003), Yildrim (2003), and Lane and Milesi-Ferritti 
(2003).  
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where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, Assetsijt denotes the financial assets of 
country j held by country i at time t, GDP is real GDP, Pop is Population, Dist is the 
distance between i and j, Area is the size of land area of the country, Border is a binary 
variable which is unity if i and j share a land border and Language is a binary variable 
which is unity if i and j have a common language.  
Tables 8 and 9 present the estimation results of specification (1) for total portfolio 
assets and for bank claims respectively.  Column (1) reports random effect estimation and 
column (2) between effects estimation result.13  In columns (3) and (4) we also added 
bilateral trade flows to the explanatory variables, reporting the estimation results.14 
Consistent with Portes and Rey, we found that the gravity model fit the data very 
well and most estimated coefficients were statistically significant with the expected sign.  
                                            
13 We omit the fixed-effect “within” estimation results.  This method can provide more consistent estimates 
by controlling for the influences from omitted country-specific factors.  One drawback of this fixed-effect 
approach is, however, that since the fixed effect estimator exploits variation over time, we cannot obtain the 
estimates for time-invariant factors such as distance, area, land border, common language as well as a regional 
dummy.  We believe that the fixed-effect estimation is not appropriate for our analyses since the time span 
of our sample is too short.  A more serious problem is that the regional dummy variables that will be 
investigated later are time-invariant and hence cannot be estimated by the fixed-effect regression.  
14 Adding bilateral trade flows as an explanatory variable may be subject to an endogeneity problem.  
However, as will be confirmed later in this section, the existence of bilateral trade flows little changes major 
regression results, contributing to the robustness of our conclusions.  
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To briefly summarize the common features of the random- and between-effects estimation 
results in both tables, the estimated coefficients for the bilateral distance were significantly 
negative and the estimated coefficients for the log of GDP in pair, log of per capita GDP in 
pair, common land border dummy and common language dummy were significantly 
positive.  When we add bilateral trade flows as a regressor variable, most coefficients 
preserve the same sign with statistical significance. The coefficient of bilateral trade flows 
is also positive and statistically very significant, indicating that even after taking 
consideration of the conventional explanatory variables of the gravity equation, trade may 
independently foster more financial integration.  
 The above regression results suggest that a gravity model can be used as a 
benchmark to appropriately explain normal financial asset exchanges.  Now this paper 
will investigate how deeply financial integration is entrenched in East Asia by introducing 
two dummy variables, EA_single and EA_pair, as additional regressors. EA_single is a 
dummy variable that takes one, if either a host or destination country belongs to East Asia 
and EA_pair a dummy variable that takes one if both countries do. The estimated 
coefficient of EA_single captures the additional asset exchanges involved with an East 
Asian country in general. The estimated coefficient of EA_pair represents the additional 
asset exchanges when both countries belong to East Asia.  Hence, how deep financial 
integration is among East Asia, relative to their integration with the rest of the world, can be 
measured by subtracting the estimated coefficient of EA_single from that of EA_pair. 
 Table 10 reports the estimation results for portfolio asset holdings when the new 
dummy variables are added.  Since the between-effects estimation results are very similar, 
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only random-effects estimation results are presented.15 In column (1), we find that the 
coefficient of EA_single is negative while the coefficient of EA_pair is positive, indicating 
that there is some evidence of regional financial integration. However, neither coefficient is 
statistically significant. Furthermore, when we added bilateral trade to explanatory 
variables in column (2), while the coefficient of bilateral trade is positive and statistically 
very significant, the coefficient of EA_pair turned negative. Hence, the evidence of regional 
financial integration is very weak, if any, and most of it might be explained by trade 
integration in the region.    
  In order to compare the degree of financial integration in East Asia with that for 
Europe, we have also added the same two dummy variables for Europe, that is, 
Europe_single and Europe_pair, and reported the estimation results in columns (3) and (4) 
without and with trade as an additional regressor, respectively. Even after the European 
dummies were added, the estimated coefficients of East Asian dummies were hardly 
changed except that the coefficient of East_single becomes statistically significant.  In 
contrast, the coefficients of Europe dummies were very significant with the opposite sign to 
each other. Especially, the coefficient of Europe_pair is very large and positive, which 
implies that European countries make portfolio investments particularly more among 
themselves. Since the coefficient of Europe-single is negative, its subtraction from the 
coefficient of Europe_pair is even larger, implying that European countries more heavily 
invest in each other than they do in the rest of the world. The estimated coefficients indicate 
                                            
15 The between-effects estimation results are available upon request. 
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that Europe invest 13 times more among themselves.16   
 So far, we have confirmed that the regional financial integration is much deeper in 
Europe than in East Asia.  Is this because East Asia is more closely linked to the global 
financial markets?  To answer the question, we added three more dummies: Global, 
EA_global and Europe_global; the first dummy takes a value of one if either a host or 
destination country represents a global financial market and zero otherwise, the second 
dummy takes a value of one if the pair of countries represent an East Asian country and a 
global financial market, and the third dummy takes a value of one if they were a European 
country and the global financial market. The coefficient of Global, measures how more 
financial integration involving a global financial market, is made in general.  On the other 
hand, the coefficients of EA_global and Europe_global capture how East Asian and 
European countries are relatively more intertwined to the global market respectively. The 
global financial market is defined in two ways. The first case includes only the U.S. market 
and the second case, both the U.S. and the U.K. markets.   
 In Table 11, we find that the coefficient of Global is positive and statistically 
significant both in columns (1) when the U.S. represents the global market and in (2) when 
the U.S. and the U.K. do. This indicates that the global financial markets indeed play an 
important role in world financial integration. However, the global link is relatively more 
important for East Asian and European countries: the coefficients of EA_global and 
Europe_global were positive, much larger and statistically very significant. Surprisingly the 
coefficient of Europe_global was even larger, indicating that European countries are more 
                                            
16 This figure is calculated as e2.462-(-0.109)=13.1. 
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deeply linked to the global markets as well.   
Only when we compared the relative importance of the global market vis-a-vis the 
regional market for East Asia (EA_global vs. EA_pair) with that for Europe (Europe_global 
vs. Europe_pair), we realize that East Asia places relatively more importance in the global 
financial integration instead of regional financial integration. The estimated coefficients of 
East Asia were 2.571 or 2.313 for the global integration vs. 0.272 or 0.323 for the regional 
integration, depending on the definition of global, while the corresponding figures for 
Europe were 3.957 or 2.793 for the global integration vs. 2.604 or 2.228 for the regional 
integration. The estimated coefficient of the global integration is dominatingly larger that 
that of the regional integration in magnitude only for East Asia.  
 When we added bilateral trade as an additional regressor in columns (3) and (4), 
the above findings still were preserved. Further the coefficient of trade is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating a possibility that trade plays additionally an independent 
role to foster financial integration. The coefficient of EA_pair is no longer statistically 
significant if trade is used as an additional regressor. This again supports the view that the 
regional financial integration in East Asia, while low, is mainly due to the trade integration 
taking place in the region.       
 Now we turn to the same regression results based on the bank claims data set. In 
Table 12, we report the evidence of how deep financial integration is in both regions by 
relying on the same set of equations as in Table 10.  Unlike the case of portfolio asset 
holdings, we now find much stronger evidence of regional integration in East Asia. The 
coefficient of EA_pair in column (1) is positive and statistically very significant. Even after 
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bilateral trade is added as a regressor, the coefficient of EA_pair in column (2) becomes 
even larger and still statistically very significant.  When we compared the degree of 
regional financial integration in East Asia with that of Europe, in columns (3) and (4), the 
degree of regional financial integration in East Asia (0.819 or 1.099) is quite comparable to 
that of Europe (1.116 or 1.103).  Subtracting the estimated coefficients of EA_single (-
0.231 or -0.075) and Europe_single (0.295 or 0.276) from these figures, yields even higher 
estimates of regional integration in East Asia.  
 Table 13 reports the same set of estimation results as Table 11 to verify the relative 
degree of regional integration compared with that of global integration based on the bank 
claims data.  Generally, we found that the importance of global integration is higher in 
East Asia.  The estimated coefficients of global vs. regional integration were 2.208 (or 
2.280) vs. 1.351 (or 1.412) in East Asia, while the corresponding figures for Europe were 
1.190 (or 1.790) vs. 1.190 (or 0.983).  Since the values in parentheses were estimated 
when the U.K. market was included in the global markets, it tended to overstate the global 
integration and underestimate the regional integration in Europe.  In both cases, however, 
relatively global integration is deeper in East Asia.    
 Why did we reach a different conclusion when we used the bank claims data 
instead of the portfolio investments data?  At the first glance, one may argue that this is 
solely due to the different definition of the regional dummy, EA_pair. Since we have bank 
claims data available only for three host countries, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, no 
observation was included if bank loans were made between any pair of the remaining seven 
countries. Since relatively fewer bank loans were expected to occur between them, we 
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postulate that the estimated measure of the regional integration derived from the bank 
claims data may be overstated.  We tested this possibility by redefining the regional 
dummy, EA_pair, for the portfolio investment estimation in the same way as the bank 
claims estimation. That is, by assigning a value of one only when any of the three countries 
is a host country.  We reestimated the same set of equations in Tables 10 and 11 and found 
that the estimated coefficients hardly change (not reported), implying that the distinction is 
not due to the difference in the definition of the regional dummy.   
Another possibility is that, since bank loans were more likely involved with trade 
than portfolio investments, the evidence of regional financial integration in the bank claims 
data should only reflect heavy trade integration in the region.  The extent of intra-regional 
trade indeed increased substantially in East Asian economies between the 1980s and the 
1990s. In 2000, the share of intra-region trade in total trade is above 50% in most East 
Asian economies, except for Japan and the Philippines. However, we believe that this 
argument is not supported by the data either, since the importance of the regional financial 
integration in East Asia does not disappear even after trade flows is added to regressors. 
We conjecture that the difference is due to the special role played by the banks in 
East Asia.  Traditionally the financial systems in East Asia are largely bank-oriented.  
While most of the banks in East Asia are small in size and have a limited access to 
international capital markets, some banks must have been active in providing funds to East 
Asia. 
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III. Regional versus Global Consumption Risk Sharing 
 
1. Regional versus Global Risk Sharing 
 
Empirical studies on risk sharing have grown rapidly in recent years. The formal 
literature started by testing the null hypothesis of full risk sharing at various aggregation 
levels, such as among individuals in a village (Townsend, 1994), households (Altug and 
Miller, 1990, Cochrane, 1991, Mace, 1991), countries (Canova and Ravn, 1996, Lewis, 
1996). These papers were essentially based on the consumption Euler equation under 
complete (asset) markets as the implication of the perfect risk sharing. For example, in a 
simple theoretical model, consumption growth rate of individual country is equal to (world) 
aggregate consumption growth rate under perfect risk sharing. 
 Most of these studies rejected the null hypothesis of perfect risk sharing. 
Subsequently, literature started to investigate how incomplete the risk sharing arrangement 
is. Crucini (1999), Crucini and Hess (2000), Obstfeld (1994, 1995), Hess and Shin (2000), 
and Asdrubali and Kim (2003) addressed such issues. A simple version of such empirical 
framework can be described as follows.  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Rieycc ititwtit ,...,2,1,log1loglog =+Δ−+Δ+=Δ λλα   (2) 
 
where cit is the consumption of the country i, yit is the income of the country i, cwt is the 
consumption of the world, the constant term, α, may reflect the difference in the discount 
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factor across countries, the error term, eit, may reflect the preference shocks, and λ 
represents the degree of risk sharing. To the extent that the risk sharing arrangements are 
established (λ), its consumption growth rate follows the aggregate consumption growth rate 
since the country-specific risks are shared. However, the rest (fraction 1-λ) of the 
consumption growth rate follows its own income growth rate since that is what is 
domestically available.1718 The equation (2) can be estimated by non-linear least square 
method. The restrictions, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, can be imposed to exclude unrealistic cases. 
The above framework is simple and intuitive, but it only considers risk sharing 
arrangements of a country with the world economy as a whole. However, there is a 
possibility that risk sharing arrangements of a country are more intensive with countries in 
a specific region than with the remaining countries. For example, the countries in the 
European Union may have more intensive sharing arrangement with EU member countries 
than with the remaining countries. In this paper, by extending the framework of the past 
studies, we developed a framework to analyze the risk sharing arrangements of a country 
                                            
17 Crucini (1999) uses the permanent income instead of the current income by assuming that international 
intertemporal trade is perfect. On the other hand, Obstfeld (1995) used the current income by assuming 
financial autarky. Asdrubali and Kim (2003) discuss the intermediate cases. If an income process follows a 
random walk, changes in current income and permanent income would be equal.  For more details, see 
Asdrubali and Kim (2003). 
18 The presence of common shocks does not strongly bias the estimate.  The above regression equation can 
be re-organized as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )log log 1 log log , 1,2,...,it wt it wt itc c y c e i Rα λ ⎡ ⎤Δ −Δ = + − Δ −Δ + =⎣ ⎦ .    When 
aggregate income changes are similar to aggregate consumption changes, the regression is similar to using 
country specific variables. 
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not only with the world but also within a region.  
We first assume that there was a specific region. By extending the logic of the 
empirical framework of the previous section, we argued the following. To the extent that 
one country established risk sharing arrangements within the region ( rλ ), the consumption 
growth rate of the country follows the consumption growth rate of the aggregate 
consumption of the region. Similarly, to the extent that one country established risk sharing 
arrangements with the world ( wλ ), the consumption growth rate of the country follows the 
consumption growth rate of the aggregate consumption of the world. The rest of the 
consumption growth rate of the country follows its income growth rate (1 r wλ λ− − ). This 
idea can be expressed as the following equation. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )log log log 1 log , 1, 2,...,it w wt r rt w r it itc c c y e i Rα λ λ λ λΔ = + Δ + Δ + − − Δ + =  (3) 
 
By rearranging equation (3), the following equation can be obtained: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
log log log log
1 log log , 1, 2,...,
it wt r rt wt
w r it wt it
c c c c
y c e i R
α λ
λ λ
Δ −Δ = + Δ −Δ
+ − − Δ −Δ + =   (4) 
 
In the above equations, λr, λw, and 1-λr-λw can be interpreted as the degree of regional risk 
sharing, the degree of global risk sharing, and the extent that neither of risk sharing 
arrangements is arranged. Equation (4) can be estimated using a non-linear least square 
method. The restrictions, 0 ≤ λr ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λw ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ λw + λr ≤ 1 can be imposed to 
exclude unrealistic cases. 
We applied this empirical framework to Asian and European countries to infer the 
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degree of regional risk sharing (risk sharing with the region) and the degree of global risk 
sharing (risk sharing with the world). Asian countries under consideration were: China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand. European countries under consideration were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerlands, and the U.K. The world in our model is assumed to 
consist of these 10 Asian countries, these 17 European countries, other G-7 countries (the 
U.S. and Canada), Australia, and New Zealand.  
For consumption and income growth rates, real per capita consumption growth rate 
(in domestic currency) and real per capita GDP growth rate (in domestic currency) are used. 
The aggregate consumption growth rates of the two regions and the world were constructed 
as the weighted average of real per capita consumption growth rate of individual countries. 
Here, the weight was determined by the relative size of the country’s total consumption (in 
PPP) to the aggregate total consumption (in PPP). Individual countries’ real per capita 
variables were obtained from the WDI, and consumption (in PPP unit) was obtained from 
the Penn World Table 6.1. 
 
2. Empirical Results 
 
Table 14 reports the estimation results for individual countries for the sample 
period of 1961-2002.19 The numbers in the parenthesis are standard errors and ‘*’ indicates 
                                            
19 The constant term was dropped since it was insignificant in most estimation. 
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that the coefficients are significant at 5% level. The restrictions of 0 ≤ λr ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λw ≤ 1, 
and 0 ≤ λw + λr ≤ 1 are imposed in the estimation. To easily compare Asian and European 
countries, the table reports the average numbers in the two regions. In addition, another 
average number, which treats the insignificant estimate as zero, is calculated and reported, 
in order to exclude the influence of large insignificant estimates.  
The pattern of regional and global risk sharing for Asian and European countries is 
quite different. Compared to European countries, Asian countries have a lower degree of 
risk sharing within the region but a higher degree of global risk sharing. The simple average 
number for the estimates for the degree of regional risk sharing for Asian countries was 
0.149, which was lower than that for European countries, 0.318. The number for the degree 
of global risk sharing for Asian countries was 0.123, which was larger than that for 
European countries, 0.048.  
When we only considered the estimates which are statistically significant, we 
reached the same conclusion. Out of the 10 Asian countries, there were four countries that 
regional risk sharing was statistically significantly estimated and four countries that global 
risk sharing was statistically significantly estimated. In contrast, out of the 17 European 
countries, there were nine countries where regional risk sharing was statistically 
significantly estimated and no countries that global risk sharing was statistically 
significantly estimated. The conclusion was similar when we used the average number that 
treats the insignificant estimate as zero. The estimates for the degrees of regional and global 
risk sharing for Asian countries were 0.122 and 0.123, respectively, while those for Europe 
 27
were 0.236 and 0.20 When we did not impose the restrictions on λr and λw, the conclusion 
is similar. 
On the other hand, the overall extent of risk sharing was larger in Europe; the 
average of the estimates for the extent of no risk sharing arrangement (1-λr-λw) were 0.729 
for Asia and 0.626 for Europe. Except for two European countries, the estimates were 
significantly different from zero. This implies that the risk sharing arrangements are not 
perfect in most countries, which is consistent with the results of the past studies. 
Table 15 reports the simple average numbers for Asian and European countries for 
various subperiods. First, we cut the sample up to 1996, in order to exclude the effects of 
the Asian crisis. Second, we divide our sample into two subperiods, 1961-1980 and 1981-
2002. Third, we estimated for the period of 1973-2002, in order to count the world wide 
exchange rate regime changes in early 1970s. For all these subperiods, we reached similar 
conclusions. Asian countries tend to have weak regional risk sharing arrangements but 
strong global risk sharing arrangements, compared to Europe. In addition, the degree of 
overall risk sharing arrangements tends to be higher in Europe than in East Asia.  
 
IV. Why is the Regional Financial Integration Low in East Asia?  
 
Empirical results in previous sections from the gravity model of international asset 
holdings and the consumption risk sharing model indicated that East Asia tends to be more 
integrated to regional financial markets than to global financial markets, compared to 
                                            
20 The average is zero since none of the estimates are significantly different from zero. 
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Europe. In this section, we discuss three main hypotheses that may help explain the low 
financial integration within East Asia: incentives for portfolio diversification/risk sharing, 
the development and deregulation of financial markets, and the monetary and exchange rate 
regime.  
 
1. Incentives for Portfolio Diversification/Risk Sharing among East Asia 
  
Theoretical models such as International Capital Asset Pricing Model (I-CAPM), 
imply that investors should diversify their portfolios to the greatest possible extent by 
investing more in securities which show a low degree of correlation with the home portfolio. 
This implies that countries with different structures, subject to different economic shocks, 
with low business cycle correlation, will find it more advantageous to develop closer 
financial links with one another. In this regard, extensive portfolio diversification within 
East Asia may not be necessarily an optimal strategy, considering the homogeneity of East 
Asian economies. 
Eichengreen and Park (2005a) refute this hypothesis. They claim that Europe is 
more homogenous in income and structure, and more synchronized in business cycles, but 
more integrated than East Asia. In this regard, we report the cross-country output 
correlation for East Asian and European countries for various subperiods in Table 16. The 
number under “Reg” shows the correlations of the growth rate for each country’s output 
and the growth rate of the regional aggregate output.21 The number under “Glob”, on the 
                                            
21 The regional and global aggregates are constructed by a similar method to that used in Section III.   
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other hand, shows the correlations of the growth rate for each country’s output and the 
growth rate of the world aggregate output. The table also indicates the average correlation 
for East Asia and Europe. The average of regional correlation for East Asia ranges between 
0.24-0.50 while that for Europe ranges between 0.05-0.11. The average of global 
correlation for East Asia ranges between 0.30-0.39, while that for Europe ranges between 
0.37-0.44. In contrast to Eichengreen and Park (2005a)’s claim, we found that the regional 
correlation of East Asia is higher than that of Europe while the global correlation of East 
Asia is not higher than that of Europe.22 This result may imply that the welfare gains for 
regional financial integration are lower in East Asia than in Europe. This might alternately 
explain why East Asia has a lower degree of regional financial integration than Europe.  
In general, investors tend to invest the bulk of their financial wealth in domestic 
assets. An interesting question is whether this phenomenon of ‘home bias’ in portfolio 
investment is weaker at the country level than at the regional level. If a country is strongly 
integrated with regional financial markets but weakly integrated with global financial 
markets, ‘home bias’ at the country level can be weaker than ‘home bias’ at the regional 
level. However, for East Asian countries, ‘home bias’ at the country level does not seem to 
be weaker than ‘home bias’ at the regional level, based on our results that regional financial 
integration within East Asian countries are very weak. 
                                            
22 The simple output correlation does not suggest the sources of shocks. Therefore, the substantial 
synchronization of business cycles among the countries within a region can be caused by a common global 
shock rather than a regional shock. But, Lee, Park, and Shin (2004) show that, based on dynamic factor model 
that isolate independent regional and global components, the regional component explains more than half of 
output variance for individual East Asian economies in 1990s.  
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As surveyed by Lewis (1999), there are a number of reasons suggested in the 
literature to explain home bias at the country level. First, domestic equities can provide a 
better hedge for risks that are specific to the home country.  For example, hedges against 
domestic inflation and hedges against wealth (not traded in capital markets) such as human 
capital, are better provided through domestic assets. Second, the gains from global 
diversification may not be too large, compared to the costs involved.  If the costs of 
acquiring and holding foreign equities are sufficiently large, then investors may find it 
better to keep their savings at home.  Third, information is much more easily 
communicated at a country level.  This information superiority enables portfolios solely 
based on domestic assets to perform better than global portfolios.   
These arguments do not seem to generalize well at the regional level for East Asia. 
First, business cycle synchronization within East Asian countries is not much weaker than 
business cycle synchronization of East Asian countries with the rest of the world. Therefore, 
East Asian countries may not find hedges through regional markets to be far more 
beneficial than those through global markets. Second, Investing in East Asia may involve 
with even a larger costs since most East Asian countries are developing countries with 
under-developed financial markets. Third, information sharing may not be easier among 
East Asian countries than among European countries, and East Asian countries may have 
better information on financial markets of developed countries like the US than on financial 
markets of mostly underdeveloped East Asian countries. On the other hand, these factors 
seem to be more applicable to European countries. Therefore, East Asia would be less 
inclined to intensify their financial linkages with one another in the region than other 
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European countries are.  
 
2. Development and Deregulation of Financial Markets23 
 
There are several institutional and structural characteristics in East Asian financial 
systems that constrain regional financial integration. Because of the underdevelopment of 
financial markets, trade in regional securities between different East Asian countries is 
likely to have been relatively minute. 
In East Asia, where financial systems have been largely bank-oriented, securities 
markets have been relatively less developed. The inadequate financial and legal structure, 
low auditing and accounting standards, and weak corporate governance must have 
hampered the development of regional capital markets. After a long period of bank-oriented 
systems and financial repression, East Asian capital market institutions are not well 
equipped for the management of East Asia’s external financial transactions. The brokerage 
services for investing in foreign securities have mostly been provided by Western financial 
institutions. It is therefore natural that financial market liberalization and openings have 
contributed to integrating East Asia’s financial markets into global financial markets than to 
creating integrated regional financial markets.  
Except for the Japanese banks, most other East Asian banks - which are small in 
size - have relatively limited experience in international corporate banking, and small 
branch networks. There are not that many domestic investment banks, securities firms, and 
                                            
23 See Lee, Park and Shin (2004) and Eichegreen and Park (2005a, 2005b) 
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mutual funds efficient enough to compete against their counterparts from developed 
countries. In the absence of these securities institutions, underwriting securities in 
international capital markets in East Asia have been mostly dominated by American and 
European investment banks.  
Although Hong Kong and Singapore have been two important regional financial 
centers in East Asia, it still lacks an anchor country or financial center that can mediate 
financial transactions within the region, helping to attract regional investors into the 
regional securities markets. These two centers were serving East Asian borrowers and 
lenders well before financial market opening got underway in the region.  However, they 
were essentially outposts of major international capital markets in advanced countries. Thus, 
they may have gravitated more toward linking financially East Asian economies with 
advanced economies, than integrating them with one another.  
It is also true that a number of countries in East Asia still remain behind the capital 
market liberalization process by relying frequently on capital controls. Restrictions on 
capital account transactions and on entering foreign financial institutions must be an 
impediment to the process of financial integration involving these economies.  
Eichengreen and Park (2005b) provide evidence that a lower level of capital market 
liberalization and an underdevelopment of financial markets and institutions particularly in 
potential lending countries are the main factors contributing to the difference between the 
intra-Europe and intra-East Asia integration in the cross-border bank lending market. 
Chelley-Steeley and Steeley (1999) found that the abolition of exchange controls helped 
equity markets to become more closely integrated in Europe. 
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3. Monetary and Exchange Rate Regime  
 
There are a number of studies in the literature that focus on how a choice of the 
exchange rate regime affects the volume of cross-border financial transactions. Most of 
these studies show that higher exchange rate volatility will lead to fewer transactions in 
trade in assets, as well as trade in goods. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) show that 
correlations between current account positions and per capita incomes increase more for 
future European Monetary Union (EMU) countries in 1990s, suggesting that monetary 
integration enhanced financial integration. Danthine et al. (2000) and Fratzscher (2001) 
provide evidence that the introduction of the Euro has increased the degree of financial 
integration in Euro countries. Spiegel (2004) also argues that overall international 
borrowing is facilitated by the creation of monetary unions, particularly based on the 
evidence from Portugal’s Accession to the EMU. Evidence supports that the degree of 
financial integration has increased significantly after the introduction of Euro. In addition, 
based on the broad set of more than 150 countries, Lee and Shin (2004) found that risk 
sharing is greatly enhanced under monetary union. 
In this sense, a higher degree of exchange rate volatility must contribute to a lower 
degree of financial integration in East Asia. Since we restricted our sample primarily to the 
period since 1999 in the studies of cross-border assets, the exchange rate volatility at least 
in the Euro is completely eliminated. In contrast, most of East Asia chose to float their 
exchange rates after the crisis in 1997-8, contributing to higher volatilities in their exchange 
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rates. In this regard, Kim, Kim, and Wang (2005) and Kim (2004) investigated the 
exchange rate arrangements in East Asian countries before and after currency crisis. They 
found that many East Asian countries adopted a free floating after Asian crisis, based on 
both “de jure” and “de facto” measures. On the other hand, a similar logic may be applied 
to the results of risk sharing estimations using a longer sample periods since European 
countries are more eager to stabilize the intra-European exchange rate, for example, 
through the ERM.  
Another special feature after the financial crisis is that East Asia had accumulated a 
substantial amount of dollar reserve assets. East Asia, with a ‘fear of floating’ against the 
US dollar, have intervened in the foreign exchange market so as to moderate excessive 
volatility of exchange rates and moreover to maintain competitiveness of export sectors. 
The East Asian economies tended to hoard their reserves in low-yielding US Treasuries and 
other dollar denominated financial assets. This strong tendency of East Asia to invest in 
dollar-denominated safe-assets may have had a negative impact on regional integration.  
After Asian crisis, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, China, and ASEAN member 
countries have sought for financial and monetary cooperation within the region, to ward off 
future financial crisis. In May 2000, these countries met at the annual meeting of Asian 
Development Bank in Chiang Mai, Thailand, and announced their intention to cooperate in 
four principle areas: monitoring capital flows, regional surveillance, swap networks, and 
training personnel. ("Chiang Mai Initiative" refers specifically to the swap arrangements). 
Since then, there have been various efforts and steps to promote financial and monetary 
cooperation among these countries. Swap arrangements can be regarded as a risksharing 
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tool at the regional level, although current analysis does not comprise it. In addition, further 
developments in financial and monetary cooperation within these countries are likely to 
help to enhance the regional financial market integration in East Asia. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks  
 
We have assessed the extent to which East Asian economies are integrated through 
regional financial markets, especially in comparison with their integration into global 
financial markets. It is often claimed that the level of financial market integration within 
East Asia is relatively low. Based on the gravity model of cross-border portfolio asset and 
bank claim holdings, we found that there is some evidence of regional financial integration 
in East Asia. However, East Asia tends to be relatively more linked to the global markets 
than integrated with one another in the region, particularly compared to Europe. The 
consumption risk sharing model also indicated that East Asia tend to have relatively weaker 
regional risk sharing arrangements, but stronger global risk sharing arrangements compared 
to Europe.  
A subsequent question raised by our results, is what has caused this low level of 
financial integration within East Asia. We have inquired into the plausible hypotheses that 
can explain the differing experience in East Asia and Europe. The low incentives for 
portfolio diversification within East Asia, the low degree of development and deregulation 
of financial markets, and the instability in monetary and exchange rate regime are 
considered the main causes of low financial integration within East Asia. One critical issue 
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was to investigate exactly what role each factor plays in regional and global financial 
integration process. An investigation into this issue, which can be conducted by extending 
the gravity framework with additional data, will shed a light to what policies are needed to 
strengthen financial integration within East Asia.  
Another important question arises as to the extent to which countries should pursue 
regional integration along with global integration. Although increased regional financial 
integration, given the extent of global integration, can be beneficial in many ways, it is 
rather unclear what constitutes the optimal degree of regional integration relative to global 
integration, given the benefit and costs of regional financial integration. For instance, 
regional financial market integration helps to share country-specific risks within the region 
and contributes to improve welfare, but it can also make regional shocks transmit through 
the financial markets and thus increase the vulnerability of the national economy. 
Furthermore, regional financial integration may occur by substituting for global integration 
and thus lower national welfare. In subsequent research, we plan to pursue these important 
and interesting questions.  
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Table 1. Geographical Distribution of Total Portfolio Asset Holdings in 2003 
 
% of Portfolio Assets Held in Each Region Total 
Source Country 
East Asia* Europe (U.K) U.S.A. (bln US $) (percent in GDP)
Hong Kong 16.3  27.0  14.5  13.9  334.9  213.8 
Indonesia 11.3  15.2  2.1  24.8   1.8  0.9  
Japan 1.3  35.3  5.8  36.0  1721.3  40.0  
Korea 7.9  16.6  6.4  45.9   17.3  2.9  
Malaysia 45.9  23.4  5.2  18.1   1.7  1.6  
Philippines 7.0  19.5  10.6  68.9   3.7  4.6  
Singapore 20.2  38.9  18.2  15.7  143.9  157.5 
Thailand 2.9  20.5  4.6  64.2   2.7  1.9  
Average 14.1  24.6  8.4  35.9  278.4  52.9  
       
Austria 1.3  70.6  5.0  9.9  206.8  81.7  
Belgium 0.8  68.3  4.2  7.8  417.8  138.4 
Denmark 4.4  56.5  7.5  22.9  127.0  59.9  
Finland 1.5  82.3  8.7  8.1  107.4  66.4  
France 2.8  72.7  9.2  11.1  1367.0  77.8  
Germany 2.7  63.5  6.4  11.1  1205.1  50.1  
Greece 0.2  47.1  14.7  14.2   34.0  19.7  
Iceland 4.6  36.9  15.0  23.9    3.7  35.1  
Ireland 3.3  56.3  19.2  27.4  811.6  528.0 
Italy 2.0  48.2  5.3  12.5  791.1  53.9  
Netherlands 3.8  58.8  9.5  27.8  782.6  153.0 
Norway 7.7  60.1  10.4  22.9  184.4  83.5  
Portugal 0.1  66.4  6.4  6.0   97.3  65.8  
Spain 0.6  69.0  8.9  8.5  432.7  51.6  
Sweden 5.1  46.0  12.4  30.7  213.7  70.9  
Switzerland 2.5  43.4  5.0  14.6  654.4  204.4 
United Kingdom 10.9  41.7  0.0 25.0  1729.5  96.4  
Average 3.2  58.1  8.7  16.7  539.2  108.0 
       
United States 14.3  52.8  21.2  0.0. 3134.2  28.6  
* 9 economies including China 
Source: International Monetary Fund, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 1997, 2001, 
and updated data from the IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm 
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Table 2. Geographical Distribution of Total Equity Asset Holdings in 2003 
 
% of Equity Assets Held in Each Region Total 
Host Country 
East Asia* Europe (U.K) U.S.A. (bln US $) (percent in GDP) 
Hong Kong 17.4  22.7  20.1  5.2  152.8  97.5  
Indonesia 12.5  56.3  0.0  6.3   0.02  0.0  
Japan 3.9  30.9  12.0  52.0  274.5  6.4  
Korea 8.4  5.7  3.0  28.1   3.4  0.6  
Malaysia 75.0  5.5  1.8  10.9   0.9  0.8  
Philippines 1.2  -- -- 86.1   0.2  0.2  
Singapore 27.9  21.0  8.9  16.3  42.7  46.8  
Thailand 12.5  13.3  1.2  16.9   0.2  0.2  
Average 19.9  22.2  6.7  27.7  59.3  19.1  
       
Austria 4.0  50.2  7.2  19.2  44.0  17.4  
Belgium 1.7  42.0  4.9  8.6  140.3  46.5  
Denmark 9.8  48.8  12.6  27.0  52.1  24.6  
Finland 4.3  67.0  15.8  13.5  36.5  22.5  
France 6.2  60.3  10.0  15.8  337.7  19.2  
Germany 4.2  45.1  7.6  14.5  440.8  18.3  
Greece 1.1  36.6  18.6  35.7  3.9  2.3  
Iceland 5.1  33.0  15.7  24.9   3.4  32.0  
Ireland 9.3  44.8  20.4  31.3  211.4  137.5  
Italy 4.1  31.0  4.7  11.6  331.0  22.5  
Netherlands 7.4  39.4  15.5  42.8  327.1  64.0  
Norway 8.7  49.1  15.9  30.2  76.4  34.6  
Portugal 0.9  45.7  9.6  9.5  11.5  7.7  
Spain 2.5  60.2  16.3  10.5  83.4  9.9  
Sweden 6.3  36.9  13.9  32.9  141.7  47.0  
Switzerland 4.0  28.2  5.0  17.7  293.7  91.7  
United Kingdom 18.4  34.9  0.0 26.8  749.8  41.8  
Average 5.8  44.3  11.4  21.9  193.2  37.6  
       
United States 18.9  52.9  20.2  0.0 2080.3  19.0  
* 10 economies including China 
Source: International Monetary Fund, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 1997, 2001, 
and updated data from the IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm 
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Table 3. Geographical Distribution of Total Long-Term Debt Securities Holdings in 
2003 
 
% of Debt Securities Held in Each Region Total 
Source Country 
East Asia* Europe (U.K.) U.S.A. (bln US $) (percent in GDP) 
Hong Kong 14.4  31.7  10.0  21.8  154.1  98.4  
Indonesia 11.8  15.6  2.2  21.4    1.7  0.8  
Japan 0.8  36.4  4.4  32.9  1407.2  32.7  
Korea 7.8  19.0  6.8  50.3   13.8  2.3  
Malaysia 15.3  41.3  8.9  26.0   0.8  0.8  
Philippines 11.0  6.8  1.4  72.7   2.2  2.7  
Singapore 17.2  35.0  5.7  24.9  57.6  63.0  
Thailand 2.2  23.1  5.6  68.6   2.2  1.6  
Average 10.1  26.1  5.6  39.8  205.0  25.3  
       
Austria 0.5  76.1  4.4  7.2  159.5  63.0  
Belgium 0.3  81.9  3.5  7.1  264.3  87.5  
Denmark 0.6  61.9  4.0  19.9  73.6  34.7  
Finland 0.0  89.7  5.0  5.6  66.3  40.9  
France 1.7  76.7  7.4  9.2  909.7  51.8  
Germany 1.8  74.5  5.7  8.6  750.0  31.2  
Greece 0.1  47.8  12.8  11.4  29.4  17.1  
Iceland 0.0  77.7  7.2  13.5   0.3  3.0  
Ireland 1.8  67.9  14.3  18.0  385.7  250.9  
Italy 0.5  60.2  5.6  13.3  453.7  30.9  
Netherlands 1.2  73.1  5.1  16.9  449.0  87.8  
Norway 7.1  67.9  6.6  17.3  105.2  47.6  
Portugal 0.0  67.0  7.2  6.4  71.1  48.1  
Spain 0.1  72.4  7.4  8.3  327.5  39.0  
Sweden 2.9  64.0  9.4  26.5   66.0  21.9  
Switzerland 1.3  56.9  4.8  12.5  335.4  104.8  
United Kingdom 0.9  44.8  0.0 24.1  875.7  48.8  
Average 1.2  68.3  6.5  13.3  313.1  59.4  
       
United States 6.2  46.3  16.5  0.0 868.9  7.9  
* 10 economies including China 
Source: International Monetary Fund, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 1997, 2001, 
and updated data from the IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm 
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Table 4. Geographical Distribution of Total Short-Term Debt Securities Holdings in 
2003 
 
% of Debt Securities Held in Each Region Total 
Source Country 
East Asia* Europe (U.K) U.S.A. (bln US $) (percent in GDP) 
Hong Kong 21.8 24.0  8.7  17.9 28.0  17.9  
Indonesia 0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.1  0.0  
Japan 1.3  28.2  13.7  35.4 39.7  0.9  
Korea 0.0  59.6 59.6 40.4 0.09  0.0  
Malaysia 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.01  0.0  
Philippines -- -- --  60.1  1.3  1.6  
Singapore 16.9  61.7 43.9 3.0 43.6  47.7  
Thailand 0.0  6.2 0.0 71.1  0.3  0.2  
Average 5.7  40.0  18.0 41.0 14.1  8.5  
       
Austria 0.5  73.0  5.8  12.6   3.2  1.3  
Belgium 0.1  74.9  8.8  12.9  13.2  4.4  
Denmark 0.0  60.9  2.6  31.9   1.4  0.6  
Finland 0.0 97.0  6.3  2.2   4.6  2.9  
France 1.5  78.1  21.1  12.4  119.6  6.8  
Germany 0.0  54.2  7.2  34.4  14.3  0.6  
Greece 0.0  83.1  82.4  7.5  0.6  0.3  
Iceland 0.0  50.0  0.0  16.7  0.01  0.1  
Ireland 0.0  46.5  26.8  40.4  214.5  139.5  
Italy 0.5  87.3  18.4  2.8  6.4  0.4  
Netherlands 2.0  49.6  13.3  16.0  6.5  1.3  
Norway 0.0  64.8  1.5  34.5  2.8  1.3  
Portugal 0.0  80.0  0.0  1.3  14.8  10.0  
Spain 0.0  51.5  3.0  3.5  21.8  2.6  
Sweden 0.0  62.4  10.5  24.7   6.0  2.0  
Switzerland 0.0  41.0  9.6  6.7  25.4  7.9  
United Kingdom 0.3  60.8  0.0 19.3  104.1  5.8  
Average 0.3  65.6  12.8  16.5  32.9  11.0  
       
United States 0.5  82.2  53.6  0.0 185.0  1.7  
* 10 economies including China 
Source: International Monetary Fund, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 1997, 2001, 
and updated data from the IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm 
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Table 5. Geographical Distribution of Cross-Border Bank Claim Holdings in 2003 
 
% of Bank Claims Held in Each Region Total 
Source Country 
East Asia* Europe (U.K) U.S.A. (bln US $) 
(percent 
in GDP) 
Japan 7.3  35.6  8.3  39.5         1238.2   28.8  
South Korea 35.7  21.2  9.8  21.2           50.8    8.4  
Taiwan China 26.2  22.9  6.2  37.1           83.2   29.1  
Average 23.1  26.6  8.1  32.6  457.4 22.1  
       
Austria 4.1  53.1  10.0 3.8           97.8  38.6  
Belgium 3.7  73.6  16.5 12.3          658.0  218.0  
Denmark 0.1  86.4  23.2 5.0           82.2   38.8  
Finland 1.5  75.8  6.2  13.5           57.8   35.7  
France 13.2  49.5  13.6 23.1         1353.4   77.0  
Germany 6.3  61.1  20.2 18.1         2576.4  107.2  
Greece 0.9  49.3  12.4 14.9           49.9   29.0  
Ireland 4.8  82.4  27.9 4.1          341.7  222.3  
Italy 2.8  58.1  15.3 7.7          328.8   22.4  
Netherlands 6.4  54.5  12.9 26.9         1190.8  232.8  
Norway 0.8  60.8  8.6  12.0           17.2    7.8  
Portugal 0.2  72.0  16.3 10.0           68.9   46.6  
Spain 0.4  49.9  7.7  6.6          409.4   48.8  
Sweden 0.9  75.4  11.9 11.5          216.9   71.9  
Switzerland 6.9  34.3  17.6 48.2         1565.0   488.9  
United Kingdom 16.8  29.9  0.0  33.0         1637.4    91.2  
Average 4.1  60.4  13.8 15.7  665.7 111.1  
       
United States 19.8  48.9  16.9 0.0 838.3   7.7  
* 10 economies including China 
Source: The Bank for International Settlements, available from the BIS website at 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/histstats10.htm.  
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Table 6. Geographical Distribution of Asset Holdings in Latin America, 2003 
 
 % of Assets Held in Each Region Total 
Source Country Latin America Europe (U.K) U.S.A. bln US $ % in GDP
TOTAL PORTFOLIO     
Argentina 3.0  6.3  0.8  86.7  13.1  10.1  
Brazil 15.3  18.0 7.1  35.3  4.5  0.9  
Chile 3.6  23.5 4.8  25.4  13.0  17.9  
Colombia 1.4  7.4  2.1  62.6  1.9  2.4  
Mexico 6.0  6.0  2.0  76.4  5.1  -- 
Panama 42.3  6.0  2.9  45.1  3.6  27.8  
EQUITY        
Argentina 1.8  8.1  1.0  83.2  7.5  5.8  
Brazil 14.2  18.2 3.3  29.2  2.5  0.5  
Chile 0.3  22.4 4.9  23.0  10.7  14.8  
Colombia 0.0  5.4  2.7  37.8  0.7  0.9  
Mexico -- -- -- 23.8  0.4  0.1  
Panama 71.3  1.2  0.2  8.3  0.8  6.5  
LONG-TERM DEBT      
Argentina 4.6  3.9  0.5  91.2  5.5  4.2  
Brazil 23.2  8.5  1.4  51.9  0.6  0.1  
Chile 19.5  28.5 4.0  36.7  2.2  3.1  
Colombia 2.6  7.7  1.7  77.2  0.9  1.2  
Mexico 7.8  2.8  2.5  85.1  4.0  0.6  
Panama 31.9  7.2  4.1  57.8  2.4  19.0  
SHORT-TERM DEBT      
Argentina 0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.2  0.1  
Brazil 13.7  21.7 16.5  39.3  1.4  0.3  
Chile 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Colombia 0.7  10.9 1.5  77.0  0.3  0.3  
Mexico --  26.1 -- 59.1 0.8  0.1  
Panama 45.4  9.2 0.3 44.0 0.3  2.3  
BANK CLAIMS       
Brazil 5.9  49.3 19.4  28.6  23.8  4.8  
Chile 24.4  27.0 2.8  39.0  2.2  3.0  
Mexico 14.3  2.8  0.0  37.1  2.1  0.3  
Panama 48.1  10.7 3.0  27.6  7.9  61.2  
 
Source: The International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements. 
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Table 7. Summary Statistics (1999-2003) 
 
 (1) Portfolio 
(N=13,971) 
(2) Bank Claims   
(N=11,974) 
 Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Year 2001.975 0.823 2001.203 1.409 
Log of trade 3.797 2.634 4.560 2.617 
Log of distance 8.129 0.834 8.075 0.837 
Log of GDP in 
pairs 
40.794 2.814 41.649 2.640 
Log of per capita 
GDP in pairs 
8.004 1.869 8.552 1.699 
Log of area in pairs 24.431 3.076 24.298 2.866 
Common land 
border dummy 
0.028 0.166 0.024 0.153 
Common language 
dummy 
0.150 0.358 0.130 0.336 
Real Portfolio 22.343 170.739 -- -- 
Bank Claims -- -- 1.245 1.688 
East Asia 0.012 0.111 0.010 0.102 
Europe 0.059 0.233 0.104 0.305 
Note: The summary statistics are based on the bilateral variables for the portfolio holdings and bank claims 
data sets. See the text for an explanation of variables and sources of them.  
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Table 8. Portfolio Estimation 
 
 (1) 
Random Effects 
(2) 
Between Effects
(3) 
Random Effects
(4) 
Between Effects 
Log distance 
 
-0.203** 
[0.017] 
-0.193** 
[0.017]
-0.118** 
[0.019]
-0.082** 
[0.019] 
GDP in pair 0.150** 
[0.008] 
0.145** 
[0.008] 
0.063** 
[0.011] 
0.031* 
[0.012] 
Per capita 
GDP in pair 
0.136** 
[0.011] 
0.131** 
[0.011] 
0.141** 
[0.010] 
0.134** 
[0.010] 
Common 
language 
0.120** 
[0.035] 
0.111** 
[0.035] 
0.065 
[0.035] 
0.038 
[0.035] 
Border 0.641** 
[0.094] 
0.635** 
[0.095] 
0.488** 
[0.093] 
0.428** 
[0.096] 
Area in pair -0.001 
[0.006] 
-0.002 
[0.006] 
0.008 
[0.006] 
0.009 
[0.006] 
Log trade 
  
0.106** 
[0.010] 
0.139** 
[0.012] 
Observation 
13,971 13,971 13,971 13,971 
R-squared 
0.38 0.37 0.39 0.39 
Note: All the variables are bilateral ones between country i and country j. The dependent variable, real 
portfolio investment asset holdings, refers to the case where country i is a source country and country j is a 
destination country.  It is taken logarithm after adding 1 to include all the observations with value zero.  All 
other explanatory variables except the dummy variables are taken logarithm. Robust standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses.  Intercept and year dummy variables are included (not 
reported). ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1 % and 5 % levels 
respectively. 
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Table 9. Bank Claims Estimation 
 
 (1) 
Random Effects 
(2) 
Between Effects
(3) 
Random Effects
(4) 
Between Effects 
Log distance 
 
-0.280** 
[0.023] 
-0.289** 
[0.024]
-0.194** 
[0.024]
-0.110** 
[0.026] 
GDP in pair 0.339** 
[0.011] 
0.335** 
[0.012] 
0.230** 
[0.015] 
0.123** 
[0.018] 
Per capita 
GDP in pair 
0.146** 
[0.015] 
0.154** 
[0.015] 
0.148** 
[0.014] 
0.146** 
[0.014] 
Common 
language 
0.415** 
[0.049] 
0.416** 
[0.049] 
0.347** 
[0.048] 
0.273** 
[0.048] 
Border 1.100** 
[0.137] 
1.063** 
[0.138] 
0.988** 
[0.133] 
0.841** 
[0.134] 
Area in pair -0.059** 
[0.009] 
-0.058** 
[0.009] 
-0.045** 
[0.008] 
-0.037** 
[0.009] 
Log trade 
  
0.121** 
[0.011] 
0.242** 
[0.016] 
Observation 
11,974 11,974 11,974 11,974 
R-squared 
0.63 0.62 0.64 0.63 
Note: All the variables are bilateral ones between country i and country j. The dependent variable, real bank 
claims of country i on country j, is taken logarithm after adding 1 to include all the observations with value 
zero. For others see the note for Table 8. 
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Table 10. Portfolio Estimation with Regional Dummies 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log distance -0.201** 
[0.018]
-0.106** 
[0.020]
-0.028 
[0.017]
0.059** 
[0.018] 
GDP in pair 0.151** 
[0.009] 
0.068** 
[0.012] 
0.158** 
[0.008] 
0.081** 
[0.011] 
Per capita GDP in pair 0.135** 
[0.011] 
0.133** 
[0.011] 
0.067** 
[0.010] 
0.065** 
[0.010] 
Common language 0.120** 
[0.035] 
0.066 
[0.035] 
0.155** 
[0.031] 
0.105** 
[0.031] 
Border 0.642** 
[0.094] 
0.493** 
[0.093] 
0.496** 
[0.083] 
0.361** 
[0.082] 
Area in pair -0.002 
[0.007] 
0.003 
[0.007] 
-0.020** 
[0.006] 
-0.016* 
[0.006] 
EA_single -0.01 
[0.040] 
-0.074 
[0.040] 
-0.066 
[0.037] 
-0.124** 
[0.037] 
EA_pair 0.022 
[0.157] 
-0.118 
[0.154] 
0.191 
[0.137] 
0.058 
[0.135] 
Europe_single 
  
-0.109** 
[0.027] 
-0.107** 
[0.026] 
Europe_pair 
  
2.461** 
[0.068] 
2.423** 
[0.067] 
Log trade 
 
0.110** 
[0.010] 
 
0.102** 
[0.009] 
Observations 
13,971 13,971 13,971 13,971 
R-Squares 
0.38 0.47 0.39 0.48 
Note:  The dependent variable is real portfolio investment asset holdings.  For other information see the 
note for Table 8. 
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Table 11. Portfolio Estimation with Regional and Global Dummies 
 (1) U.S. (2)U.S. and U.K. (3) U.S.  (4) U.S. and U.K.
Log distance -0.048** 
[0.016]
-0.041** 
[0.015]
0.028 
[0.017]
0.035* 
[0.017] 
GDP in pair 0.128** 
[0.008] 
0.117** 
[0.008] 
0.061** 
[0.010] 
0.050** 
[0.010] 
Per capita GDP in pair 0.049** 
[0.009] 
0.070** 
[0.009] 
0.048** 
[0.009] 
0.068** 
[0.009] 
Common language 0.123** 
[0.029] 
0.093** 
[0.029] 
0.081** 
[0.029] 
0.051 
[0.029] 
Border 0.524** 
[0.075] 
0.588** 
[0.075] 
0.406** 
[0.075] 
0.468** 
[0.074] 
Area in pair -0.022** 
[0.006] 
-0.013* 
[0.006] 
-0.018** 
[0.006] 
-0.009 
[0.006] 
Global 0.493** 
[0.068] 
0.371** 
[0.047] 
0.477** 
[0.067] 
0.362** 
[0.047] 
EA_global 2.571** 
[0.227] 
2.313** 
[0.162] 
2.437** 
[0.224] 
2.215** 
[0.160] 
EA_single 0.022 
[0.035] 
-0.004 
[0.035] 
-0.029 
[0.035] 
-0.054 
[0.035] 
EA_pair 0.272* 
[0.123] 
0.323** 
[0.123] 
0.153 
[0.122] 
0.203 
[0.121] 
Europe_global 3.957** 
[0.163] 
2.793** 
[0.119] 
3.898** 
[0.161] 
2.755** 
[0.117] 
Europe_single -0.042 
[0.025] 
-0.082** 
[0.025] 
-0.042 
[0.025] 
-0.080** 
[0.024] 
Europe_pair 2.604** 
[0.062] 
2.228** 
[0.062] 
2.569** 
[0.061] 
2.199** 
[0.061] 
Log trade   0.090** 
[0 009]
0.090** 
[0 009]
Observations 13,971 13,971 13,971 13,971 
R-squares 0.42 0.43 0.56 0.56 
Note:  The dependent variable is real portfolio investment asset holdings.  For other information see the note for Table 8. 
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Table 12. Bank Claims Estimation with Regional Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log distance -0.244** 
[0.025]
-0.090** 
[0.027]
-0.142** 
[0.026]
0.01 
[0.027] 
GDP in pair 0.346** 
[0.013] 
0.330** 
[0.012] 
0.243** 
[0.015] 
0.229** 
[0.015] 
Per capita GDP in pair 0.143** 
[0.015] 
0.099** 
[0.015] 
0.136** 
[0.015] 
0.092** 
[0.015] 
Common language 0.400** 
[0.049] 
0.478** 
[0.048] 
0.332** 
[0.048] 
0.405** 
[0.047] 
Border 1.159** 
[0.137] 
1.115** 
[0.133] 
1.050** 
[0.132] 
1.003** 
[0.129] 
Area in pair -0.066** 
[0.009] 
-0.051** 
[0.010] 
-0.058** 
[0.009] 
-0.045** 
[0.009] 
EA_single -0.152** 
[0.049] 
0.014 
[0.055] 
-0.231** 
[0.048] 
-0.075 
[0.053] 
EA_pair 0.994** 
[0.192] 
1.284** 
[0.188] 
0.819** 
[0.186] 
1.099** 
[0.181] 
Europe_single 
  
0.295** 
[0.045] 
0.276** 
[0.044] 
Europe_pair 
  
1.116** 
[0.085] 
1.103** 
[0.082] 
Log trade 
 
0.125** 
[0.011] 
 
0.125** 
[0.011] 
Observations 
11,974 11,974 11,974 11,974 
R-Squares 
0.63 0.65 0.64 0.66 
Note:  The dependent variable is real bank claims of country i on country j.  For other information see the 
notes for Tables 8 and 9.. 
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Table 13. Bank Claims Estimation with Regional and Global Dummies 
 (1) U.S. (2)U.S. and U.K. (3) U.S.  (4) U.S. and U.K.
Log distance -0.103** 
[0.026]
-0.101** 
[0.025]
-0.005 
[0.026]
-0.002 
[0.026] 
GDP in pair 0.315** 
[0.013] 
0.304** 
[0.013] 
0.217** 
[0.015] 
0.205** 
[0.015] 
Per capita GDP in pair 0.086** 
[0.015] 
0.096** 
[0.015] 
0.078** 
[0.014] 
0.088** 
[0.014] 
Common language 0.451** 
[0.047] 
0.414** 
[0.047] 
0.381** 
[0.046] 
0.345** 
[0.046] 
Border 1.131** 
[0.129] 
1.206** 
[0.127] 
1.020** 
[0.125] 
1.095** 
[0.123] 
Area in pair -0.054** 
[0.009] 
-0.050** 
[0.009] 
-0.048** 
[0.009] 
-0.044** 
[0.009] 
Global 0.003 
[0.091] 
0 
[0.059] 
-0.027 
[0.088] 
-0.005 
[0.057] 
EA_global 2.208** 
[0.285] 
2.280** 
[0.200] 
2.069** 
[0.274] 
2.180** 
[0.192] 
EA_single 0.018 
[0.056] 
-0.03 
[0.055] 
-0.073 
[0.055] 
-0.115* 
[0.054] 
EA_pair 1.351** 
[0.183] 
1.412** 
[0.179] 
1.162** 
[0.177] 
1.225** 
[0.173] 
Europe_global 1.190** 
[0.210] 
1.790** 
[0.148] 
1.175** 
[0.202] 
1.774** 
[0.142] 
Europe_single 0.288** 
[0.048] 
0.256** 
[0.044] 
0.264** 
[0.047] 
0.239** 
[0.043] 
Europe_pair 1.190** 
[0.083] 
0.983** 
[0.082] 
1.175** 
[0.080] 
0.973** 
[0.079] 
Log trade   0.123** 
[0 011]
0.124** 
[0 011]
Observations 11,974 11,974 11,974 11,974 
R-squares 0.64 0.67 0.66 0.69 
Note: The dependent variable is real bank claims of country i on country j. For other information see the note for Table 8. 
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Table 14. The Estimates of Regional and Global Risk sharing, 1961-2002. 
 
(1) Asia 
 Regional (λr) Global (λw) None (1-λw -λr) Adjusted R2 
China 0.570* (0.038) 0.000 (0.000) 0.430* (0.038) 0.727 
Hong Kong 0.238* (0.091) 0.000 (0.000) 0.762* (0.091) 0.396 
Indonesia 0.224 (0.176) 0.000 (0.000) 0.776* (0.176) 0.248 
Japan 0.045 (0.090) 0.218* (0.052) 0.738* (0.060) 0.845 
South Korea 0.212* (0.080) 0.000 (0.000) 0.788* (0.080) 0.619 
Malaysia 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 1.000* (0.000) 0.568 
Philippines 0.000 (0.000) 0.464* (0.042) 0.536* (0.042) 0.412 
Singapore 0.000 (0.000) 0.335* (0.056) 0.665* (0.055) 0.598 
Taiwan 0.198* (0.057) 0.000 (0.000) 0.802* (0.059) 0.292 
Thailand 0.000 (0.000) 0.210* (0.059) 0.790* (0.059) 0.678 
Average 1 0.149 (0.053) 0.123 (0.021) 0.729 (0.066) 0.538 
Average 2 0.122 0.123 0.729 --- 
 
(2) Europe 
 Regional (λr) Global (λw) None (1-λw -λr) Adjusted R2 
Austria 0.158 (0.161) 0.189 (0.239) 0.653* (0.260) 0.519 
Belgium 0.757* (0.234) 0.075 (0.178) 0.167 (0.137) 0.365 
Denmark 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 1.000* (0.000) 0.512 
Finland 0.170* (0.050) 0.000 (0.000) 0.830* (0.050) 0.820 
France 0.597* (0.092) 0.000 (0.000) 0.402* (0.094) 0.702 
Germany 0.467* (0.217) 0.063 (0.144) 0.470* (0.136) 0.486 
Greece 0.347 (0.290) 0.191 (0.269) 0.462* (0.091) 0.456 
Ireland 0.377 (0.334) 0.129 (0.356) 0.494* (0.113) 0.319 
Italy 0.258* (0.094) 0.000 (0.000) 0.742* (0.094) 0.668 
Luxemburg 0.887* (0.062) 0.000 (0.000) 0.113 (0.059) 0.280 
Netherlands 0.124 (0.106) 0.000 (0.000) 0.876* (0.106) 0.526 
Norway 0.170 (0.431) 0.021 (0.278) 0.808* (0.173) 0.409 
Portugal 0.157 (0.141) 0.000 (0.000) 0.843* (0.141) 0.362 
Spain 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.876* (0.051) 0.863 
Sweden 0.378* (0.099) 0.000 (0.000) 0.621* (0.101) 0.455 
Switzerland 0.501* (0.044) 0.000 (0.000) 0.499* (0.044) 0.636 
UK 0.056 (0.222) 0.152 (0.162) 0.792* (0.156) 0.398 
Average 1 0.318 (0.152) 0.048 (0.096) 0.626 (0.106) 0.516 
Average 2 0.236 0.000 0.610 --- 
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Table 15. The Estimates of Regional and Global Risk sharing (Average), Various Subperiods. 
 
  1961-1996 1961-1980 1981-2002 1973-2002 
Asia 0.197 (0.056) 0.184 (0.146) 0.166 (0.025) 0.204 (0.042) Regional (λr) 
Europe 0.340 (0.146) 0.372 (0.190) 0.329 (0.107) 0.402 (0.134) 
Asia 0.140 (0.021) 0.164 (0.153) 0.119 (0.029) 0.121 (0.025) Global (λw) 
Europe 0.060 (0.086) 0.127 (0.118) 0.019 (0.031) 0.037 (0.080) 
Asia 0.668 (0.047) 0.652 (0.131) 0.724 (0.049) 0.676 (0.102) None (1-λw-λr) 
Europe 0.628 (0.109) 0.501 (0.123) 0.645 (0.089) 0.550 (0.099) 
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Table 16. Cross-country output correlation 
 
Asia 
 1961-2002 1961-1996 1961-1980 1981-2002 1973-2002 
 Reg Glob Reg Glob Reg Glob Reg Glob Reg Glob
China 0.81 0.34 0.86 0.36 0.90 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.60 0.27
Hong Kong 0.24 0.47 0.11 0.42 0.17 0.51 0.57 0.39 0.40 0.48
Indonesia 0.23 0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.76 0.29 0.54 0.22
Japan 0.20 0.48 0.12 0.46 0.21 0.53 0.57 0.39 0.67 0.59
Korea 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.53 0.77 0.39 0.59 0.49
Malaysia 0.21 0.27 0.01 0.15 -0.03 0.33 0.68 0.24 0.43 0.32
Philippines -0.03 0.05 -0.09 0.01 -0.11 0.13 0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.05
Singapore 0.21 0.29 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.64 0.47 0.50 0.43
Thailand 0.42 0.64 0.41 0.66 0.48 0.69 0.50 0.57 0.53 0.69
Taiwan 0.44 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.81 0.31 0.69 0.38
Average 0.32 0.34 0.24 0.30 0.26 0.37 0.58 0.34 0.50 0.39
           
Europe 
 1961-2002 1961-1996 1961-1980 1981-2002 1973-2002 
 Reg Glob Reg Glob Reg Glob Reg Glob Reg Glob
Austria 0.10 0.34 0.10 0.32 0.22 0.38 -0.14 0.17 -0.18 0.22
Belgium 0.12 0.49 0.09 0.46 0.14 0.40 0.27 0.65 0.06 0.50
Denmark 0.06 0.52 0.05 0.52 0.06 0.57 0.08 0.36 0.23 0.58
Finland 0.09 0.34 0.12 0.34 0.24 0.23 -0.11 0.42 0.00 0.31
France 0.11 0.52 0.12 0.52 0.27 0.68 -0.12 0.31 0.00 0.50
Germany 0.26 0.62 0.25 0.61 0.36 0.73 0.18 0.43 0.23 0.59
Greece 0.18 0.47 0.18 0.49 0.31 0.53 -0.07 0.32 0.30 0.48
Ireland -0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.13 -0.13 -0.02 -0.09 0.30 0.09 0.23
Italy -0.14 0.35 -0.20 0.33 -0.24 0.19 0.30 0.65 0.06 0.52
Luxemburg 0.22 0.49 0.28 0.51 0.30 0.65 0.05 0.41 0.20 0.54
Netherlands 0.31 0.60 0.37 0.61 0.47 0.57 0.02 0.61 -0.02 0.56
Norway -0.19 0.01 -0.27 -0.05 -0.49 -0.52 0.24 0.41 -0.10 0.06
Portugal 0.13 0.45 0.13 0.45 0.18 0.53 0.08 0.21 0.27 0.52
Spain -0.17 0.31 -0.17 0.31 -0.21 0.22 0.04 0.44 0.00 0.36
Sweden 0.02 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.09 0.14 -0.08 0.53 -0.06 0.31
Switzerland -0.05 0.36 -0.05 0.36 -0.04 0.23 -0.05 0.56 0.06 0.43
UK 0.32 0.69 0.36 0.71 0.38 0.77 0.23 0.61 0.47 0.78
Average 0.08 0.41 0.08 0.41 0.11 0.37 0.05 0.43 0.10 0.44
 
